of Cleon's son, where we perceive him not as Cleon's son but as white,
and the white thing bunnyteens com which we really perceive happens to be Cleon's
bunnyteens com son.
But in the case of the common sensibles there is already in us a
general sensibility which enables us to perceive them directly;
bunnyteens com there is therefore no special sense required for their perception:
if there were, our perception of them would have been exactly like
what has been above described.
The senses perceive each other's special objects incidentally; not
because the percipient sense is this or that special sense, but
because all bunnyteens com form a unity: this incidental perception takes place
whenever
sense is directed at one and the same moment to two disparate
qualities in one and the same object, e.Bunnyteens com g. to the bitterness and the
yellowness of bile, the bunnyteens com assertion of the identity of both bunnyteens com cannot be
the act of either of the senses; hence the illusion of sense, e.g. the
bunnyteens com belief that
bunnyteens com if a thing is yellow it bunnyteens com is bile.
It might be asked bunnyteens com why we have more senses than one. Is it to prevent
a failure to apprehend the common sensibles, e.g. movement, magnitude,
and number, which go along with the bunnyteens com special sensibles? Had we no sense
but sight, and that sense no object but white, they would have
tended to escape bunnyteens com our notice and everything would have merged for us
into an indistinguishable identity because of the concomitance of
colour bunnyteens com and bunnyteens com magnitude. As it is, the fact that the common sensibles are
given